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I. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
a. Nature of the Case. 
This appeal arises from a lawsuit by Appellant Seth Griffith against Respondent 
JumpTime Meridian, LLC ("JumpTime"), which owns and operates the JumpTime trampoline 
court in Meridian, Idaho. Griffith alleged that JumpTime was negligent in its supervision of him 
when he was a customer of the trampoline court in January, 2014, which resulted in Griffith 
suffering fractures in his C6 and C7 vertebrate. Griffith specifically alleged that JumpTime' s 
supposed in-house rules prohibited customers from landing flips into the facility's foam pits onto 
one's back. Griffith had been at JumpTime for approximately 45 minutes prior to his accident, 
and had performed a number of double front flips into the foam pit, which he had landed on his 
back without incident. Without providing any warning to the trampoline court monitor on duty, 
Griffith then attempted a triple front flip into the foam pit. Prior to this, Griffith had never before 
attempted a triple flip. Griffith under rotated his triple flip and landed on his neck, which resulted 
in his cervical spine injuries. Griffith asserted that JumpTime's failure to enforce an alleged "no 
back landing" rule caused him to believe he could complete the triple front flip without injury. 
The District Court granted JumpTime's motion for summary judgment, finding that Griffith had 
"failed to prove any breach of duty by JumpTime which caused the plaintiff's injury." Griffith 
then moved for reconsideration of that decision, which the District Court denied. 
Griffith has appealed the district court's decision to grant summary judgment. Griffith's 
sole issues on appeal are whether a triable question of fact existed regarding what JumpTime's 
rules were on the date of his injury, and whether there is evidence that Jump Time's failure to 
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enforce any rules caused his injury. However, there exists no evidence that JumpTime failed 
to comply with industry standards, or (2) that Griffith was injured due to any failure to enforce a 
"no back landing rule." In this matter, the undisputed evidence before the District Court was that 
Griffith was injured because he had landed on his neck, not his back. 
b. Statement of Facts and Procedural History. 
On the afternoon of January 11, 2014, Seth Griffith went to the JumpTime indoor 
trampoline court in Meridian, Idaho, which was owned and operated by Defendant JumpTime. 
9/14/2015 Deposition Transcript for Seth Griffith (hereinafter "Trans.", p. 34, R000063. At the 
time, Griffith was 17-years-old, and approximately five months short of his 18th birthday. Trans. 
pp. 6, 107, R 000056, 000081. Griffith had been accompanied by his 18-year-old girlfriend, and 
her two minor siblings. Trans. pp. 35-36, 43, R. 000063, 000065. Griffith executed a 
Participation Agreement, Release, and Assumption of Risk form, and had entered his initials 
where it called for a parent or guardian's signature to indemnify JumpTime and waive any 
liability for negligence. Trans. pp. 98; Exhibit 2, R. 000079; 0000102-104. Griffith testified at 
deposition that he had merely skimmed the form's language. Trans. 44, R 000065. Griffith then 
paid his admission and entered the facility. Id. Whether Griffith's waiver had any force or effect 
was never an issue that JumpTime had raised before the District Court. 
The area of Jump Time that Griffith used featured a number of "trampoline runways," as 
well as a small and large foam pit into which customers could jump or flip. Affidavit of Chad 
Babcock in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (hereinafter "Babcock 
Aff."), Exh. B, T 0000127. Griffith spent about 45 minutes showing one of his girlfriend's 
siblings how to do jumps and flips, and performing handsprings and flips on the trampoline 
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runway. Trans. p. 58, R00069. Griffith also executed a number of double flips off of trampolines 
and into the foam pits, all without incident. Id. A JumpTime trampoline court monitor had been 
on duty watching Griffith and his party. Trans. pp. 49-50, R 000066-67. 
Griffith testified at deposition that prior to going to JumpTime, he had experience at 
trampoline courts and gymnastics from several years prior, and also from using his uncle's 
trampoline. Trans. pp. 19-21, 40, R 000059, 000064. Griffith testified that he spoke with the 
trampoline court monitor twice before his accident. Trans. p. 61, R 000069. The first time was 
when he had been doing back flips and handsprings on one of the trampoline runways (and not 
into a foam pit); the monitor allegedly said the back flips were "cool." Id. The second time was 
when he had been doing double front flips into the foam pit; the monitor asked if Griffith had 
ever done double front flips before, to which Griffith responded "yes." Id. Griffith testified the 
monitor then commented something along the lines of "[t]hat is pretty sweet." Id. 
Griffith estimated that he had completed five to eight double front flips into the foam pit 
before he attempted the triple flip. Trans. p. 108, R 000081. Griffith admitted that he had never 
before attempted a triple flip. Trans. p. 70, R 000072. Griffith admitted that the triple flip was a 
"pretty good step up" from doing double flips in terms of the required skill involved. Trans. p. 
69, R 000071. However, Griffith also testified that he felt "pretty confident" that he could do the 
triple flip without hurting himself. Trans. p. 70, R 000072. Griffith did not tell the trampoline 
court monitor that he was going to attempt a triple flip. Trans. p. 60, R. 000069. Griffith 
confessed that the trampoline court monitor had not encouraged him to do the triple flip, but he 
thought it would be alright based on her not saying anything negative about his doing double 
flips Trans. p. 73, R 000072. Griffith testified that while at JumpTime, he had been pretty 
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excited, and had not been paying close attention to any safety signs or his surroundings. Trans. 
pp. 56, 80, R 000068, 000074. Further, Griffith testified that he had landed all of his flips into 
the foam pit flat on his back, and had attempted to land his triple flip on his back because he felt 
it was safer than landing on his feet. Trans. p. 64, R 000070. Griffith said that he would "just 
land flat on the foam pit, because you don't want to land on your feet because you can bash your 
head against your knees." Trans. pp. 54-55, R 000068. 
Griffith testified that he under rotated the third flip of his attempted triple flip, and came 
down "hard" on his neck, rather than his back as he had intended. Trans. pp. 58, 62, R 000069-
70. He immediately got out of the foam pit, and sat beside a wall for several minutes. Trans. p. 
59, R 000069. Griffith did not tell the trampoline court monitor that he felt hurt. Trans. p. 68, R 
000071. Griffith ultimately went home. Trans. pp. 74-75, R 000073. The next morning, Griffith 
awoke in pain. Trans. p. 75, R 000073. He went to the hospital, where he was told he had a 
broken neck, and required surgery. Trans. p. 78, R 000074. 
Griffith filed suit on March 6, 2015. Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial (hereinafter 
"Comp I."), R 00009. In his complaint, he alleged theories of premise liability, defective design 
and maintenance of equipment, and improper employee training. Compl, R 00008. Griffith also 
alleged that JumpTime breached a duty to enforce its rules. Id. On October 15, 2015, JumpTime 
moved for Summary Judgment, arguing that Griffith had failed to present any admissible 
evidence on breach and causation. Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment 
(hereinafter "Memo"), R 000105-121. In support of its Motion, JumpTime produced the 
affidavit of its owner, Chad Babcock, who is an experienced gymnast as well as manager. 
Babcock Aff., R 000122-124. Babcock testified that "Landing on one's back was not 
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prohibited pursuant to JumpTime's foam pit rules, and landing in this matter is safe and 
acceptable practice. Babcock Aff. p. 3, R 000124. Griffith did not depose Mr. Babcock, nor 
rebut his affidavit testimony. 
JumpTime also submitted the affidavit of Marc A. Rabinoff, Ed.D, an expert in 
gymnastics, human performance, and the trampoline court industry. Affidavit of Dr. Marc A. 
Rabinoff, Ed.D. in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (hereinafter 
"Rabinoff Aff."), R 00018-25. Dr. Rabinoff is Professor Emeritus in Human Performance and 
Sport at Metropolitan State University in Denver, where he has taught and coached gymnastics 
since 1984. Rabin off Aff., p. 2, R 00019. Dr. Rabinoff also is a member of the American Society 
for Testing Materials Committees for Consumer Trampolines, Trampoline Courts, and Fitness, 
and Exercise Standards of Care, which promulgated the industry-wide standards governing 
equipment design and specifications, standard operating procedures, industry safety practices, 
and employee training at trampoline court facilities such as JumpTime. Rabinoff Aff., p. 3, R 
00020. 
Dr. Rabinoff opined that there were no defects in any of the trampoline court equipment 
used by Griffith, and that JumpTime's employee training and supervision of Griffith had 
exceeded trampoline court industry standards. Rabinoff Aff., pp. 6-7, R 000023-00024. Dr. 
Rabinoff opined that trampoline court industry standards in place at the time of Griffith's injury 
required customers to land any front flip into a foam pit "on either their feet, on their buttocks, or 
on their back." Industry standards prohibited customers from landing any front flips into a foam 
pit on their head, neck, or front. "The constant for any landing in a foam pit is to have one's feet 
in front of them when they land." Rabinoff Aff., p. 5, R 000022. Dr. Rabinoff opined that it was 
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within trampoline court industry standards at the time of Griffith's accident to permit customers 
to do double or triple flips into a foam pit. Dr. Rabinoff also testified that up until Griffith 
attempted the triple flip without providing any prior warning, he appeared to be jumping within 
his capabilities. Rabinoff Aff., p. 6, R 00023. 
Dr. Rabinoff further opined that the sole cause of Griffith's accident was his attempt to 
perform a triple flip that was outside of his capabilities, and during which he failed to gain 
enough rotation to safely land, and landed on his neck. Rabinoff Aff., p. 8, R 00025. Griffith did 
not object to or rebut any of Dr. Rabinoff' s opinions at summary judgment. 
In response to summary judgment, Griffith submitted a copy of JumpTime's Pit Safety 
Rules, which state in no uncertain terms that "[p ]articipants must land on their feet[,] seat[,] or 
back." Declaration of Plaintiff's Counsel Filed in Opposition to Summary Judgment, Exh. 2, R 
000149. Griffith also produced the claim file of Dave Moore, an independent adjuster hired by 
Jump Time's surety to investigate the accident. Declaration of Dave Moore (hereinafter "Deel. 
Moore"), T 000181-303. Moore's file contained numerous hearsay statements, inadmissible 
prior settlement offers, and evidence of subsequent remedial measures by JumpTime, such as its 
posting a sign above the small foam pit after Griffith's accident which prohibited customers from 
attempting any double or triple flips. Deel. Moore, R 000302. 
JumpTime objected to the District Court's consideration of Moore's materials on 
summary judgment. In its Decision and Order Re: Motion for Summary Judgment, the District 
Court ruled that the hearsay statements by anyone other than JumpTime which were contained in 
Moore's claim file were inadmissible, and would not be considered in determining the facts 
before the Comt. Decision and Order RE: Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 3, R 000396. The 
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District Court also ruled that the settlement offers and evidence of subsequent remedial 
measures, including a photograph of the "no double or triple flips" sign, in Moore's claim file 
were inadmissible pursuant to Idaho Rules of Evidence 407 and 408. Id. 
Griffith inexplicably has included a photograph of this subsequently placed sign 
prohibiting double and triple flips in his Appellate Brief. He does not argue the District Court 
impermissibly excluded it, but asks this Court to consider it as evidence on appeal that the 
District Court's decision on breach and causation was in error, and that Dr. Rabinoff's opinions 
should be discounted and/or disregarded. Appellate' s Brief, p. 8. 
In opposition to summary judgment, Griffith did not contend, or offer any evidence that 
any of JumpTime's equipment was dangerous or defective, that JumpTime failed to warn of any 
concealed danger, or that any of JumpTime's employees were improperly trained. Griffith also 
did not contest that allowing double or triple flips was in any way outside of trampoline court 
industry standards or was created an unreasonable risk of harm. Griffith further did not respond 
to JumpTime' s evidence on summary judgment with any expert evidence that back landings 
were in violation of trampoline court industry standards, or evidence that back landings created a 
risk of unreasonable harm. 
II. 
ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
Under Idaho Code section 12-121, an award of attorney fees on appeal "is appropriate 
when this Court is left with an abiding belief that the appeal has been brought or defended 
frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation." Karlson v. Harris, 140 Idaho 561, 571, 97 
P.3d 428,438 (2004). As is explained further below in JumpTime's Response Brief, Griffith's 
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-~-·----.. "~" that the District Court erred in granting summary judgment is anchored in naked 
inferences, unfounded assertions of fact, and pure speculation. Griffith has asserted that a triable 
question of fact exists regarding whether JumpTime breached its in-house rules. This claim is 
unsupported. In any event, Griffith has offered nothing that would allow a jury to conclude that 
any action or inaction by JumpTime created any unreasonable risk of harm that was a proximate 
cause of his irtjuries. The law is clear that in order to present a prima facie case for negligence 
sufficient to survive summary judgment, a claimant must demonstrate the existence of 
admissible evidence showing that a defendant created an unreasonable risk of harm, and that this 
breach in any way was the mechanism that caused the claimant's injuries. Brease v. Stinker 
Stores, Inc., 157 Idaho 443, 337 P.3d 602 (2014). Put simply, the alleged failure to enforce any 
alleged "no back landing rule" could not have caused Griffith's injury, because his injury 
resulted from his landing on his neck, not on his back. 
Griffith's appeal is rooted in the assertion that a jury should have been allowed to blindly 
infer that, had JumpTime enforced a "no back landing rule," Plaintiff would not have felt 
"emboldened" and attempted a triple flip that he incorrectly landed on his neck. However, 
Griffith testified that he had not felt encouraged by the trampoline court monitor to attempt his 
triple flip. Trans. p. 73, R 000073. Griffith's grounds for appeal completely ignore the well-
founded requirement that in order to survive summary judgment, a plaintiff must produce 
admissible evidence that a particular action or inaction must have actually produced the injurious 
result. Coombs v. Curnow, 148 Idaho 129, 139-40, 219 P.3d 453, 464-65 (2009). 
The unreasonableness of Griffith's appeal is further highlighted by the fact that he has 
asked this Court to consider evidence of subsequent remedial measures, which the District Court 
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specifically excluded from its consideration on summary judgment, as evidence of negligence. 
Griffith did not and cannot chailenge that well-grounded ruling. Accordingly, attorney fees under 
LC.§ 12-121 are appropriate 
III. 
ARGUMENT 
a. Standard of Review 
"When reviewing an order for summary judgment, this Court applies the same standard 
of review that was used by the trial court in ruling on the motion for summary judgment." 
Vreeken v. Lockwood Eng'g, B. V., 148 Idaho 89, 101, 218 P.3d 1150, 1162 (2009). 
Summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Frazier v. J.R. Simplot Co., 
136 Idaho 100, 102, 29 P.3d 936, 938 (2001). The Court must "construe all disputed facts, and 
draw all reasonable inferences from the record, in favor of the non-moving party." Nava v. 
Rivas-Del Toro, 151 Idaho 853, 857, 264 P.3d 960, 964 (2011). When the party moving for 
summary judgment will not carry the burden of production or proof at trial, "the genuine issue of 
material fact" burden is met by establishing the absence of evidence on one or more elements 
that the nonmoving party will be required to prove at trial. Once such an absence of evidence has 
been established, the burden shifts to the party opposing the motion to establish, via further 
depositions, discovery responses or affidavits, that there is indeed a genuine issue for trial. 
Sanders v. Kuna Joint School Dist., 125 Idaho 872, 874, 876 P.2d 154, 156 (Ct. App. 1994). 
The non-moving party may not rely on mere speculation to create a genuine issue of 
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material fact. Anderson v. Hollingsworth, M.D., 136 Idaho 800, 802, 41 P.3d 228, 230 (2001). 
Rather, the non-moving party must put forth admissible evidence upon which a reasonable jury 
could rely. Bromley v. Garey, 132 Idaho 807, 979 P.2d 1165 (1999). Further, "a mere scintilla of 
evidence or slight doubt as to facts is not sufficient to create a genuine issue for purposes of 
summary judgment." Samuel v. Hepworth, Nungester & Lezamiz, Inc., 134 Idaho 84, 88,996 
P.2d 303,307 (2000); see also McPheters v. Maile, 138 Idaho 391, 64 P.3d 317 (2003). 
Summary judgment will be granted if the evidence in opposition to the motion is merely 
colorable or is not significantly probative. Nelson v. Steer, 118 Idaho 409,410, 797 P.2d 117, 
118 (1990).In a negligence action the plaintiff must establish the following elements: "1) a duty, 
recognized by law, requiring the defendant to conform to a certain standard of conduct; 2) a 
breach of duty; 3) a causal connection between the defendant's conduct and the resulting injuries; 
and 4) actual loss or damage." Hansen v. City of Pocatello, 145 Idaho 700, 702, 184 P.3d 206, 
208 (2008). 
b. The District Court's Decision Should Be Upheld Because Griffith Failed to 
Produce Any Admissible Evidence that JumpTime Created Any 
Unreasonable Risk of Harm. 
Griffith raises the issue on appeal of whether a genuine issue of material fact "appeared 
to exist as to whether JumpTime had followed its own safety rules or procedures while 
supervising a minor who ultimately was severely injured. (emphasis added)" Appellant's Brief, 
pg. 1. Griffith asserts that a triable question of fact existed as to what Jump Time's rules were 
with respect to customers jumping and landing into the small foam pit in which he was injured. 
Griffith's position is that, based on the admissible evidence before the District Court, a jury 
could have concluded that JumpTime's rules prohibited customers from landing into the foam pit 
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on their back, as he had been doing, which should have precluded the District Court's grant 
of summary judgment as to breach. Appellant's Brief, pg. 10. 
To begin, the Pit Safety Rules that Griffith submitted in opposition to summary judgment 
plainly state that "Participants must land on their feet[,] seat[,] or back." Thus, the factual 
premise for Griffith's only claim, that JumpTime has a "no back landing rule," is simply wrong. 
But regardless of whether there was any admissible evidence before the trial court that 
JumpTime' s rules prohibited customers from landing on their backs in the foam pit, Griffith's 
argument fails because he did not present any admissible evidence that any action or inaction by 
JumpTime created an unreasonable risk of harm. In his Appellate Grief, Griffith, without 
foundation, describes back landings as "improper" and "dangerous." Appellant's Brief, p. 10. 
However, he makes no attempt to support these assertions with any evidence on why back 
landings might be considered dangerous, how back landing might be considered dangerous, or 
that back landings could present any unreasonable dangers that would not have been present 
when landing in another manner (such as landing sitting down/feet forward, or landing upright 
on one's feet). In other words, Griffith presented no admissible evidence that back landings 
created an unreasonable risk of harm. Whether a jury might have been able to conclude that 
JumpTime's in-house rules did not permit back landings (which JumpTime denies), in-and-of-
itself, is not evidence of breach in a negligence claim. In order to establishing a claim for 
negligence sufficient to withstand summary judgment, a plaintiff must put forth admissible 
evidence that would show that a defendant's conduct created an unreasonable and foreseeable 
risk of harm to the claimant. Brease v. Stinker Stores, Inc., 157 Idaho 443,337 P.3d 602 (2014). 
In further defining what can constitute the breach of a duty, this Court has said that 
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person has a general duty to use due or ordinary care not to injure others, to avoid injury 
to others by any agency set in operation by him, and to do his work, render services or use his 
property as to avoid such injury." Stephens v. Stearns, 106 Idaho 249, 256, 678 P.2d 41, 48 
(1984). This standard of ordinary care does not obligate a defendant to provide optimal care or 
employ the highest degree of skill; rather, a plaintiff must show that the defendant did something 
which it should not have done, or omitted something that it should have done, which caused an 
unreasonable risk of harm. Coombs v. Curnow, 148 Idaho 129, 139, 219 P.3d 453,463 (2009); 
Brease, 157 Idaho 443, 337 P.3d 602. As this Court has cautioned, the owner of a business is not 
an insurer against injury of its customers. Tommerup v. Albertson's, Inc., 101 Idaho 1, 3,607 
P.2d 1055 (1980). 
Griffith argues broadly on appeal that JumpTime's rules were in place for customer 
safety, and therefore any failure to enforce the rules must be considered evidence of negligence. 
Appellant's Brief, pg. 5. This argument completely ignores Griffith's burden in demonstrating a 
viable claim for breach. In order to present a viable claim for negligence, it was Griffith's burden 
to present admissible evidence that JumpTime's conduct was somehow unreasonable, improper, 
or fell below the standard of ordinary care. See Western Stockgrowers Ass'n v. Edwards, 126 
Idaho 939, 942, 894 P.2d 172, 175 (Ct. App. 1995) (affirming directed verdict in a negligence 
claim where, among other things, there was no evidence that defendant's conduct was 
unreasonable or improper, and thus, there was no substantial evidence upon which a jury could 
find the defendant's conduct was a breach of any duty owed without engaging in speculation). 
Again, Griffith made zero effort to develop or introduce evidence that could be used to show that 
back landings were in any way unsafe or unreasonable. As a result, there was no evidence before 
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the District Court upon which a jury could find Jump Time's conduct was unreasonable or 
improper without engaging in speculation. 
On summary judgment, the only admissible evidence before the Court regarding the 
standard of conduct required to prevent JumpTime's customers from being exposed to an 
unreasonable risk of harm was the expert testimony of Dr. Rabinoff, and the testimony of Chad 
Babcock, Jump Time's owner. Dr. Rabinoff testified that trampoline court industry standards 
permitted customers to land flips "on either their feet, on their buttocks, or on their back." 
Rabinoff Aff. p. 5, R 000023. Dr. Rabinoff also testified that JumpTime complied in all respects 
with trampoline court industry standards concerning its supervision of Griffith while a customer 
at JumpTime. Rabinoff Aff., p. 6, T 000023. Babcock testified that Landing on one's back was" 
a safe and acceptable practice." Babcock Aff., p. 3, R 000124. Griffith did not respond with any 
expert or other admissible evidence to show why or how landing on one's back was in anyway 
unsafe, dangerous, or exposed a trampoline court customer to an unreasonable risk of injury that 
could have been avoided by adhering to some other form of landing. Further, Griffith did not 
object to any of Dr. Rabinoff' s or Babcock's opinions. Dr. Rabinoff' s experience in human 
performance, gymnastics, and trampoline court's, and Babcock's experience in gymnastics, 
allowed them to opine on these issues. 
Understanding acceptable ways to land a flip into a foam pit requires knowledge of 
gymnastics, human performance, and the forces placed upon on the body in flipping and landing. 
Based on the record of admissible evidence before the district court, without the aid of expert 
opinion evidence, or some other evidence which would show that back landings were somehow 
unreasonably dangerous, a jury would have needed need to engage in pure speculation in order to 
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arrive at such a result. other words, no rational jury could conclude that back landing into a 
foam pit created an unreasonable risk of harm. In fact, when Griffith did land on his back, he was 
uninjured. 
Griffith also arbitrarily asserts on appeal that trampoline court industry standards are 
irrelevant, and that only JurnpTirne's in-house rules which allegedly prohibited back landings 
should have been applied by the District Court in establishing the applicable standard of conduct. 
Appellant's Brief. pg. 3. Griffith additionally argues that he should have been entitled to a 
reasonable inference that JurnpTirne had adopted more stringent safety standards than those 
required by the trampoline court industry. Appellant's Brief, p.2. Griffith offers no authority to 
support these positions, nor does he point to any admissible evidence to support such an 
inference. Griffith also ignores the fact that where industry standards are undisputed, they are the 
standard of conduct to which a defendant is measured in negligence cases: 
Evidence of the custom and practice of persons engaged in a trade 
or business similar to the trade or business of a party to a 
negligence suit is admissible and probative in regard to the 
requisite standard of care. Industry custom and practice are 
commonly looked to for an illumination of the appropriate 
standard of care in a negligence case, as proof of common practice 
aids in formulating a general expectation as to how individuals will 
act in the course of their undertaking. Where the evidence is 
undisputed that the defendant acted in accordance with the uniform 
custom of persons engaged in a like business, there is no 
negligence, unless it can be shown that such a custom is itself 
negligent. ... 
57A Arn. Jur. 2d Negligence§ 164 (August 2016 Update). 
Here, JurnpTirne offered undisputed testimony by Dr. Rabinoff that the practice of 
permitting back landings into the foam pit complied with trampoline court industry standards. 
Moreover, Griffith's own deposition testimony directly contradicts his assertion on appeal that 
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he should have been required to land on his feet. At deposition, Griffith testified that he would 
"just land flat on the foam pit, because you don't want to land on your feet because you can bash 
your head against your knees." Trans. p. 54-55, R. 000068. Without having offered any 
admissible evidence which could reasonably be viewed as contradicting JumpTime's evidence 
that back landings were a safe and acceptable method of landing in a foam pit, the District 
Court's grant of summary judgment in JumpTime's favor was proper. 
However, Griffith further argues that "as JumpTime presented no evidence that it 
subscribed to any standards other than those stated in its Handbook or in JumpTime's warning 
signs, JumpTime was liable for disregarding [its] own rules and procedures." Appellant's Brief, 
p. 5. In making this argument, Griffith disregards the fact that it is his burden of proof to present 
a prima facie case of negligence supported by admissible evidence; thus, it was his duty to show 
that any actions or inactions by JumpTime created an unreasonable risk of harm which bore a 
causal connection to his injury. Sanders, 125 Idaho at 156, 876 P.2d at 875. He did not. 
c. The District Court's Decision Should Be Upheld Because Griffith Has Not 
Raised Any Triable Question of Material Fact that JumpTime In Any Way 
Caused His Injuries. 
Griffith also asserts on appeal that "[t]here is a reasonable inference that [he] would not 
have attempted a triple flip if he was not encouraged to continue to improperly land his double 
flips." Appellant's Brief, pg. 9. Plaintiff's argument as to causation is fundamentally flawed on 
several levels. First, this argument misconstrues what it means to show proximate or actual 
cause. 
On summary judgment, in addition to providing evidence a person failed to use ordinary 
care, a plaintiff attempting to establish a viable claim of negligence must provide admissible 
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that the "failure to use ordinary care was the proximate cause of damage to the 
plaintiff." Pearson v. Parsons, 114 Idaho 334, 339, 757 P.2d 197,202 (1988). "[T]he mere fact 
that [an event] does not result in a favorable outcome does not establish-or even constitute 
evidence of-negligence or proximate causation." Coombs v. Curnow, 148 Idaho 129,139,219 
P.3d 453,463 (2009) (quoting Campbell v. United States, 904 F.2d 118, 1194 (7th Cir. 1990). 
Actual cause "is a factual question focusing on the antecedent factors producing a particular 
consequence." Id. Here, any rational fact finder could not conclude based on the extant record 
that JumpTime's allowing Griffith to land on his back in any way produced the particular 
consequence of him incorrectly landing on his neck. It is undisputed that Griffith did not injure 
himself because he landed on his back. Griffith's practice of back landings and his neck injury 
are simply unrelated, and no admissible evidence exists that a jury could use to conclude that 
Griffith's neck injury had anything to do with his practice of landing on his back. It had 
everything to do with his under rotating his flip and landing on his neck. 
Second, Griffith misconstrues what inferences can be drawn by the District Court on 
summary judgment. While a trial court on summary judgment must make all reasonable 
inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, any inferences must be based only on admissible 
evidence. See Gem State Ins. Co. v. Hutchinson, 145 Idaho 10, 13, 175 P.3d 172, 175 (2007) 
( emphasis added). Any inference that Griffith would not have attempted the triple flip if he had 
previously been warned against landing on his back is not based on any admissible evidence, but 
is based purely on speculation. Griffith did not point to any such admissible evidence before the 
District Court, and cannot point to any such admissible evidence now. The only causal 
connection offered is the naked inference that if Griffith had been instructed to not land on his 
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back, he would not have attempted the triple flip, and thus would not have injured himself. "Such 
an implausible inference does not rise to the level of evidence, however." Sanders v. Kuna Joint 
School Dist., 125 Idaho 872, 875, 876 P.2d 154, 157 (Ct. App. 1994). 
Moreover, the idea that a jury could find that Griffith was "empowered" or "encouraged" 
to attempt the triple flip from the monitor's conduct is plainly contradicted by Griffith's own 
testimony at deposition that "I wouldn't say she encouraged me .... " Trans. p. 73, R 000072. 
Griffith further testified that he had not given the monitor any indication that he would attempt a 
triple flip. Trans. p. 60, R 000069. Griffith's argument essentially is that evidence existed that 
JumpTime caused his injury by failing to protect him from his own negligence which JumpTime 
could not reasonably foresee. JumpTime possessed no such duty. Absent unusual circumstances 
which Griffith has not argued exist, there is no absolute duty to protect another. Coghlan v. Beta 
Theta Pi Fraternity, 133 Idaho 388, 399, 987 P.2d 300,311 (1999). 
Plaintiff has adduced no facts that would support a reasonable inference that his injuries 
were caused for any reason other than he under rotated his triple flip. His injuries have no 
bearing on his intended method of landing, but rather have everything to do with his own 
negligence in carrying out the triple flip. The naked assertion that he would not have attempted 
the triple flip if required to land in some other fashion has not been demonstrated in the record. 
In order to survive summary judgment, a plaintiff must demonstrate admissible evidence of a 
causal link between the alleged breach and his complained of harm; speculation is insufficient. 
See Bollinger v. Fall River Rural Elec. Co-op., Inc. 152 Idaho 632,642,272 P.3d 1263, 1273 
(2012). Here, Griffith did not and cannot show that his prior back landings produced the 
consequence of his broken neck, and his argument is precisely the type of post hoc inferential 
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L'-''"'"VJlHH"- that the Idaho Court Appeals has explicitly ruled is an insufficient basis for upon 
which a jury could base a verdict. Sanders, 125 Idaho at 875, 876 P.2d at 157. Thus, based on 
the extant record of admissible evidence, no fact finder could rationally find that Plaintiff's 
injury was in any way caused by any breach by JumpTime. 
d. Red Herring Issues Raised by Griffith on Appeal. 
Plaintiff inserts a number of red herrings into his arguments that have no bearing on the 
issues on appeal before this Court. The only pertinent issues on appeal are whether a question of 
material fact existed before the trial court on the issues of breach and causation. Instead of 
focusing on these points, Plaintiff has devoted a considerable amount of time in his arguments 
regarding matters which in no way address the substance of his appeal. 
To begin, Griffith attempts to emphasize the fact that he was "not accompanied by an 
adult nor had any supervisor. .. " when a customer at JumpTime. Appellant's Brief, p. 1. In 
addition to being irrelevant to this appeal, this argument is misleading. At the trial court, Griffith 
did not assert that JumpTime had any duty to ensure that he had been accompanied by an adult, 
or that his lack of a supervisor in any way caused or contributed to his injuries. Also, it is 
undisputed that Griffith was accompanied at JumpTime by his adult-age girlfriend. 
Griffith also expends considerable effort in arguing that the District Court made an 
impermissible factual finding in describing Plaintiff's prior landings as "successful." Appellant's 
Brief pgs. 4, 9. It is clear from the District Court's Decision and Order re Motion for Summary 
Judgment that its comment that Plaintiffs previous jumps were "successful" was simply to note 
that Plaintiff did not injure himself on any of his previous jumps. However, even if the Court's 
comment can be considered as a factual finding on the issue of breach-again, the only evidence 
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before the District Court regarding whether JumpTime' s allowing Plaintiff to land on his back 
was or was not negligent was Dr. Rabinoff's and Babcock's testimony that back landings were a 
safe and acceptable form of landing. Without evidence that back landings created an 
unreasonable risk of harm, the District Court was correct in finding that Griffith's prior flips had 
been successful. 
Further, Griffith argues on appeal that JumpTime failed to present any evidence before 
the trial court that it had subscribed to the trampoline court industry standards to which Dr. 
Rabinoff opined. Appellant's Brief, pg. 5. Griffith's argument is essentially that it should be 
deemed negligent if its in-house rules embraced safety standards higher than those reasonably 
required under the circumstances. Any failure to adhere to standards above and beyond the 
applicable standard of care is not negligence. Coombs, 148 Idaho at 139, 219 P.3d at 463. 
Griffith argument here is simply one more attempt by him to sidestep the fact that in order to 
survive summary judgment, he needed to present admissible evidence that JumpTime subjected 
him to an unreasonable risk of harm, and that this harm proximately caused his injuries. 
Moreover, Griffith attempts to place emphasis on the District Court's holding that "Jump 
Time owed an affirmative duty to [Griffith] to supervise him." Appellant's Brief, pg. 2, 3. This is 
argument of no consequence to Griffith's appeal. In making this ruling, the District Court merely 
was attempting to clarify that JumpTime's standard waiver of liability form had no effect in this 
matter given that Griffith was a minor. JumpTime never argued that it did. The District Court 
was clear in its Order on summary judgment that JumpTime's duty to its customers was to 
prevent the unreasonable, foreseeable risk of harm to others. Order, p. 8, R 000401. To the 
degree that Griffith argues that JumpTime assumed any duty that exceeded ordinary care, this 
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argument has no basis in law or fact under the circumstances. Even when a party has assumed a 
duty where none has previously existed, that duty is simply to act in a non-negligent manner. 
Udy v. Custer County, 136 Idaho 386,389, 34 P.3d 1069, 1072 (2001). 
Additionally, and perhaps Griffith's most egregious attempt to muddy the waters, Griffith 
has asked this Court on appeal to consider evidence of subsequent remedial measures as 
evidence of negligence. R 000396. Griffith states that JumpTime's conduct of prohibiting double 
and triple flips into the foam pit at some point after his injury is evidence that JumpTime 
subscribed to a higher standard of conduct than industry standards at the time of Griffith's injury. 
Appellant's Brief, pg. 8. There simply is no logic to such a statement; and furthermore, there is 
no question that the evidence of the signs placed above the small foam pit after Griffith's 
accident prohibiting double and triple flips was specifically excluded from evidence by the 
District Court. Order, p. 3, R 000396. Griffith has not appealed the District Court's ruling 
excluding this evidence. 
Finally, Griffith appears to argue that a jury should have been allowed to consider 
Jump Time's subsequent signs as evidence to discredit the testimony of Dr. Rabinoff. Appellant's 
Brief, p. 8-9. At the District Court, Plaintiff did not object to the admission of Dr. Rabinoff' s 
opinions, and Plaintiff's position on appeal simply has no basis. While a juror may choose to 
disregard expert evidence, the issues of credibility of an unrebutted expert witness should not be 
resolved at summary judgment. Mains v. Cach, 143 Idaho 221,225, 141 P.3d 1090, 1094 (2006). 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
If the trampoline guard had asked Seth to land on top of his feet, sitting upright, or in 
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some other fashion other than flat on his back, would he have been dissuaded from attempting 
the triple flip? Or, would he still have attempted the triple flip, under rotated it, and have landed 
incorrectly on his neck? Based on the admissible evidence before the trial court at the time of 
summary judgment, any attempt to answer these questions by a fact finder would have been 
riddled with speculation and conjecture. Also, does landing on one's back into a foam pit present 
an unreasonable risk of harm? A jury would have no factual basis to conclude that it does. 
As a result, the District Court was correct in granting summary judgment in JumpTime's 
favor. Based on the foregoing, JumpTime respectfully requests that this Court affirm the District 
Court's holding. 
DATED THIS \l day of August, 2016. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 21 
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP 
B \J ---- ~----... y --- ~- ------
David W. Knotts 
William K. Fletcher 
Attorney for Respondent 
47833.0001.827155 l 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this Jl day of August, 2016, I caused to be served a true 
copy of the foregoing RESPONDENT'S BRIEF by the method indicated below, and addressed 
to each of the following: 
Eric R. Clark, Esq. 
CLARK & ASSOCIATES, ATTORNEYS 
P.O. Box 2504 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 
[Attorney for Appellant] 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF- 22 
111 U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
D Hand Delivered 
D Overnight Mail 
If] E-mail 
D Telecopy: 208.939.7136 
William K. Fletcher 
47833.0001.827155 l .1 
